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1   Introduction 
 
Subject of the thesis 
The Himalaya clause is a contractual term that, since its inception, has sparked 
numerous discussions as to its admissibility and validity, both in the common 
law and the civil law systems: it has even been described by some as “an 
ingenious, short-term solution to a difficult problem, but a solution that raises 
infinitely more problems than it solves” 1. 
As a contractual clause contained chiefly in bills of lading (but in charter-party 
agreements alike), it has been conceived by the commercial practice in order to 
protect subjects involved in the various operations of carriage of goods by sea 
but who are not formally party to the contract of carriage which, as such, would 
be exposed to the claims of the cargo interests without being able to avail 
themselves of the defenses and limitations of liability that the carrier can benefit 
from being party to the contract.  
The Himalaya clause has then the merit of recognizing the importance of the 
operations carried out by the so-called third parties (servants, agents, 
independent contractors such as stevedores and other port operators, inland 
carriers, to mention but a few): its success and the validity of the rationale upon 
which it is founded, has been confirmed by the introduction in the Brussels 
Convention of a provision that replicates some of its effects, but this has 
nevertheless not silenced the debate around the proper legal qualification of the 
                                                        
1 W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 4 ed., 2008, p. 1856 
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clause (in light of contract law and exclusion of liability clauses mainly) and its 
overall impact on the international uniform law.  
Considerations based on the reflection that the vast majority of literature that 
deals with the Himalaya clause comes from the common law experience2 
inspired the selection of topics of this contribution towards areas that have not 
received great attention by scholars when dealing with such clause, especially 
under civil law academia.  For these reasons, the topic that always accompanies 
any discussion on the Himalaya clauses, i.e. privity of contract at common law, 
will not be touched upon in this work3, whereas issues such as the correct 
contractual construction of the clause, the amplitude of the exclusion of liability 
that it confers and its coordination with the international uniform law and other 
contracts will be discussed in detail.  
As per legal sources, no specific national legal background is offered and case-
law and national legislation when referred to, will draw from different countries, 
with the exception to the chapter 2 where most of the references will be to civil 
law countries, in an attempt to give the reader a complete picture of the legal 
category of the “contract to the benefit for a third party” (which is not found in 
common law countries). The backdrop against which the Himalaya clause will be 
analyzed is the international uniform law that presides over the matter of 
international carriage of goods by sea4. 
In light of the above, it can be affirmed that the aim of this work is to give an 
overview on the one hand of some of the main legal issues that have challenged 
the validity of the Himalaya clause and on the other hand of the benefits and 
advantages brought about by the clause over the years of its existence.  
                                                        
2 Due to the commercial reality of the shipping business where most charter-
party agreements and bills of lading are governed by English law and due to the 
fact that the difficulties posed by the common law doctrine of privity of contract 
challenged throughout the years scholars in trying to “save” the clause by 
justifying it under different theories. 
3 Unfortunately, space constraints imposed upon this work are also to be blamed 
4 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
Bills of Lading, Brussels, 1924, as amended by the Protocols of 1968 and 1979, 
referred to as Hague-Visby rules henceforth; the UN Convention on the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea, 1978, so-called Hamburg rules; UN Convention on Contracts for 
the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 2009, so-called 
Rotterdam rules; these conventions will be referred to in this work as 
“international uniform law” as well. 
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Linguistic note: for the purposes of this work, the following terms shall be 
considered interchangeable: Merchant, cargo receiver, consignee, cargo owner, 
bill of lading holder, claimant, cargo claimant, shipper, cargo interests, creditor of 
the carriage.  
 
 
2 The validity and the protection of the Himalaya clause in 
relation to the international uniform rules 
 
Under the notion of Himalaya clause is contemplated a contractual term inserted 
in bills of lading or charter-party agreements and whose aim is to benefit 
subjects which are not privy to the contract of carriage: these benefits consist in 
holding the third party not liable or extending to it the defenses and limitations 
of liability of the carrier whenever this beneficiary, by means of a negligent 
conduct in carrying out his obligations, produces a damage to, loss of or delay in 
delivery of goods carried under the contract of carriage.  
As for many contractual clauses elaborated by the commercial practice, there is 
no unique version of this clause: a version elaborated and recommended by 
BIMCO will be taken as the “specimen” clause for this dissertation: the clause is 
available at the following web-site:  
https://www.bimco.org/en/Chartering/Clauses/International_Group_of_PI_Club
s_Himalaya_Clause.aspx 5. 
The Himalaya clause proper6, typically contains two main clauses which aim at 
achieving different results: the first one (letter (a)) aims at giving a total 
protection by granting to all third parties involved in the carriage of goods an 
                                                        
5 The text of the clause is not incorporated here due to its length, but reference 
will be made to the letters that refer to the different sub-paragraphs; for the 
historical background to the clause and the reason behind its name, see W. 
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 4 ed., p. 1853. 
6 As opposed to the wider draft of the clause that appears in most bills of lading 
and contains also a second provision referred to as circular indemnity clause: see 
p. 42 
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immunity for tort liability against the claims brought by cargo receivers; the 
second sub-clause (letter (b)) purports to extend the benefits that the carrier 
receives ex lege under the international uniform conventions on carriage of 
goods by sea, the Hague-Visby rules, Hamburg rules and Rotterdam rules) 
applicable to the contract of carriage to the third parties  involved in the carriage 
of goods against claims from the cargo owners7: the advantage over the 
international uniform rules that should be attained by means of this provision in 
the Himalaya clause is to extend the carrier´s defenses to all third parties 
involved in executing, directly or indirectly, part of or all of the carriage,  
regardless of the formal legal qualification of this party and of its relationship to 
the cargo receiver: the different international conventions on carriage of goods 
by sea do not provide this protection for all third parties, but only for some third 
parties involved in the carriage and only to some extent (the conventions do not 
provide for a total immunity of the third parties protected under their rules).  
In order to better explain how the Himalaya clause has brought about a 
significant advantage by applying indistinctly to all third parties, it is necessary 
to first describe what third parties receive protection under the uniform regime 
and highlight the difficulties that arise in determining the position of a specific 
category of third parties, namely the one of independent contractors. This 
discussion will be the subject matter of the next paragraph.  
The first provision of the Himalaya clause, by granting total immunity to third 
parties, implies an exclusion of liability and will be discussed in the context of the 
rules pertaining to contractual exclusion of liability. The effects of such total 
exclusion of liability, if allowed under the ordinary rules on exclusion of liability 
clauses, will then be tested as per their legitimacy against the backdrop of the 
relevant international uniform rules.  
It must be noted how, the second sub-clause can also be construed as a clause 
that limits the liability of its beneficiary: as a matter of fact, to extend to a subject 
defenses and liability limitations, results in limiting (not totally, but partially) the 
liability amount of this party: therefore, this second clause will also be 
                                                        
7 The group of third party beneficiaries referred to in the clause by “Servant” is 
the same in the first and the second sub-paragraphs. 
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mentioned in the chapter on the exclusion of liability clauses and discussed as 
per its validity under the relevant rules on non-responsibility clauses.   
 
2.1 Differences in the notion and protection of third parties under the 
international uniform law and the Himalaya clause 
 
2.1.1 Hague-Visby rules protection 
The 1968 Protocol (Visby rules) by means of Art 4-bis n. 2 and 4, which emended 
the Brussels Convention of 1924, introduced a protection also for parties other 
than the carrier involved in the carriage of goods: servants and agents of the 
carrier would thus benefit of the same defenses and limitations of liability that 
are applicable already to the carrier ex lege 8.  This legislative amendment will 
apply only so long as the servant/agent has acted within the scope of its duties 
and has not caused the event by means of a reckless conduct with knowledge 
that the damage would have been produced or with the intent to cause the 
damage (Art 4-bis (4))9.  
Once the important matter of protecting certain subjects involved in the carriage 
operations from the negative consequences of a direct action in tort from the 
injured party10, a different question arose as to the interpretation of what 
categories of third parties would benefit from this statutory protection.  
The Brussels Convention in its French version (both English and French are the 
official languages of the amendments)11 protects the role of the preposés, while 
the English text mentions servants and agents, expressly excluding from its remit 
                                                        
8 This need for a legislative approach was also spearheaded by the difficulties in 
applying and construing the Himalaya clause, which already existed at this time: 
the Himalaya clause stems from the Adler v Dickson case of 1955: see W. Tetley, 
ibid., p.1853. 
9 It is interesting to evidence how a similar amendment had been introduced in 
the sector of air carriage by means of the 1955 Hague Protocol which reformed 
the 1929 Warsaw Convention. 
10 See above rationale for protection of third parties before a direct tort action. 
11 Which is the official version of the Convention alongside with the English one 
with regards to both 1968 Protocol (Art 17) and the 1979 Protocol (Art XI): the 
one introducing Art 4-bis is the one of 1968. 
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independent contractors12. During the travaux preparatoires (Conference of 
Stockholm 1963) it was not felt needed that the French version contain a specific 
exclusion of independent contractors, as preposés only refers to workers 
employed by the carrier, whereas the English term agent does not necessarily 
refer to an employment relationship. From these elements it seems that the 
intention of the legislator was to exclude subjects that are not under employees 
of the carrier or that are not legally bound to the orders and instructions of the 
carrier (regardless if they are employees of the carrier). 
The majority of authors seem to consider under the categories of servant/agent 
of the Brussels Conventions, workers employed by the carrier and those subjects 
that are not subordinate to the carrier but that are however part of its business 
organization (such as master and crew of the vessel)13 while excluded should be 
the subjects not part to the carrier´s business structure14. It is easy to understand 
how this point is rather delicate, as from these distinctions depends the 
possibility of extending the carrier´s protection also to an important part of the 
transportation chain: the category of independent contractors is in fact rather 
wide and comprises a large number of different professions in the phases of the 
discharging and loading of the goods from and onto the vessel: the fact that the 
operations these subjects are imputed to imply almost a constant direct contact 
with the goods makes such phases statistically speaking prone to mistakes and 
higher chances of damaging the goods arise thereof.  These activities are carried 
out by port operators (stevedoring firms for example): these subjects can either 
be contracted by means of an agreement of service by the carrier and their 
activities, if causing damage to the goods, will found extra-contractual liability 
towards the cargo owner or, they can be directly engaged by the cargo interests 
                                                        
12 From Art 4-bis (2): “… such servant or agent not being an independent 
contractor… ” 
13 The master and crew are often directly employed by the shipowner and not by 
the carrier when the carrier is a Non Vessel Owning Carrier and the carrier has 
chartered the vessel from the shipowning company: in this case the acts of the 
crew for the purposes of personal liabilities arising out of the performance of the 
carriage contract will be vicariously imputable to the carrier by virtue of a so-
called employment clause 
14 W.Goldie, The carrier and the parties to the contract of carriage, 1979, p. 
616; J. Donaldson, Servants and Agents, 1983, p. 209 
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for the loading/discharging operations and in such case the contract between 
these two parties will regulate a possible claim for damages to the goods (and 
will override any exemption clause contained in the carriage contract benefiting 
the stevedore).  
Unfortunately no guidance as to how to correctly construe the scope of the 
concept servant/agent derives from successive international conventions on 
carriage: the 1974 Athens Convention on the transportation of passengers 
replicates the category of servant/agents without further refining the meaning of 
it.   
 
2.1.2 Hamburg rules protection  
In the field of carriage of goods by sea, the Hamburg convention is the 
international legal instrument that follows the Brussels convention. 
These new rules do no longer expressly exclude an independent contractor from 
the subjects protected (Art 7(2)), but further refine the requirement for the 
protection afforded: the third party must act “within the scope of its 
employment” (Art 7(2)) and this makes it difficult to argue that an independent 
contractor is an employee of the carrier as it is not acting under the direction or 
supervision of the carrier; furthermore, it must be highlighted how the French 
version of these provisions (as opposed to the Brussels convention) contains a 
reference not only to preposés but also to mandataires, a category that could be 
translated as representatives (acting on behalf) of the carrier; on the other hand, 
some doctrine submits that the removal of the express exclusion of independent 
contractors and the insertion, in the French text, of the category of mandataire, 
cannot be ignored and that it should be interpreted as the intent of the uniform 
legislator to protect also independent subcontractors when their position can be 
subsumed under the role of agent: this would be the case when the 
subcontractor, even if not formally subordinated to the carrier, is nevertheless 
following his instructions and orders15: this interpretation seems to collide 
though with the preparatory works behind the convention, where the CNUDCI, in 
                                                        
15 W.H.C. Goldie, The Carrier and the parties to the contract of carriage, p. 625 
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1976, drafted a text of Art 7 that duplicates almost verbatim the one of Art 4-bis 
Brussels Convention16.  
Lastly, as to the correct construction of the category of servant/agent, it must 
noted that the presence of 6 official texts in the different official languages makes 
it difficult to find an interpretation of these categories that fits all purposes: some 
of the difficulties stem also from the hard task of transposing the meaning of 
terms such as “agent” in the civil law system which does not recognize such legal 
category in the common law meaning.  
The introduction of the category of actual carrier cannot be ignored with respect 
to the effects that it can have on third parties involved in the carriage of goods: it 
must be determined if the independent contractors can fall in the group of the 
actual carrier: if this question is to be answered in the affirmative, the peculiar 
liability regime adopted for such category which also benefits from the carrier´s 
exemptions and limitations, will then be applicable to the independent 
contractors as well (Art 10, specifically, paragraph 2) whereas, if the answer is 
negative, then the independent contractor will not benefit from the carrier´s 
liability regime: the inclusion in the category of actual carrier is thus significant 
for this third party, whereas for other third parties, such as servants/agents, 
their inclusion in this category would imply burdens more than benefits (as they 
already benefit from the defenses of the carrier ex Art 7). The actual carrier´s 
position, for the purposes of its liability for damages/loss/delay pertaining to the 
goods, is regulated directly by the rules of the convention (just as the position of 
the carrier): this is different from the liability of the servants/agents which is not 
regulated by the conventions (conventions of Brussels and Hamburg). The actual 
carrier is thus one party that is third to the contract of carriage (third as in not 
the party that enters into the contract of carriage vis-à-vis the shipper/cargo 
receiver) but whose position is regulated in terms of liability. The actual carrier 
is defined in the convention in Art 1(2) as “… the person to whom the performance 
of the carriage of the goods, or of part of the carriage, has been entrusted by the 
carrier, and includes any other person to whom such performance has been 
                                                        
16 G. Auchter, La convention des Nationes Unies sur le transport de merchandises 
par mer de 1978 (Règles de Hambourg, 1978), European Transport Law, 1979, p. 
397 
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entrusted”. Art 1(2) read in conjunction with Art 4(1) and (2) seem to preclude 
the possibility of including the activity of discharging and/or loading cargo in the 
specific operations that can be delegated to an actual carrier and thus the 
possibility of considering stevedores (or other terminal operators) as actual 
carriers is to be excluded17.  
Another observation to be made for the sake of a logical approach to the matter, 
is that, once the discussion on the amplitude of the category of servants/agents 
(under the two different conventions) has been conducted and resulted in 
leaving out the category of independent contractors, it must be pointed out that 
the conventions do not include independent contractors in the category of 
beneficiaries of the carrier´s protection, but the same conventions do not exclude 
that their position be relieved as to their liability by means of a contractual 
agreement (except for specific third parties, namely shipowner as ex Art 3(8) 
Brussels convention or the actual carrier ex Art 23 Hamburg rules).   
 
2.2 Techniques adopted to equate the effects of a tortious claim to a 
contractual claim under the international uniform law rules 
As evidenced above, the peculiar protection granted to third parties to the 
contract of carriage consists in making them benefit of the liability limitations 
and exclusions granted to the carrier. It is interesting to mention the technique 
used in order to realize this assimilation in the liability position of the third 
parties to the carrier´s.  
This solution has been introduced first by the Himalaya clause, subsequently 
implemented in aviation law by the Hague Protocol 1955 which modified the 
Warsaw Convention of 1929 and only then appeared in the maritime sector in 
occasion of the Visby Protocol in 1968 modifying the Hague rules by introducing 
Art. 4-bis(2) and (3), later on reaffirmed in the body of the Hamburg rules and 
the Rotterdam rules, respectively Art 7(2)/Art10(2) and Art 4(1).   
This device consists in a procedural rule, that allows the third party (the third 
party protected will vary based on the rules that apply to the bill of lading) to 
                                                        
17 See more in Sze Ping-fat, Carrier´s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg rules, 2002, p. 29 
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avail itself of the defenses and limitations of the carrier against any claim 
brought by the cargo interests in relation to damages/loss or delay of the cargo 
suffered by the claimant. The nature of the claim presented before the court 
(meaning, the fact that the claim is extra-contractual), for the purposes of the 
protection of the third party against liability, is then not relevant, as the effects of 
the carrier´s protection are extended onto the claims against the third parties.  
This liability regime introduced in the field of transportation “dissolves” the 
differences between a tortious liability and a contractual one.  
All possible attempts by the cargo interests to bring a recourse based in tort in 
the hope to receive a more advantageous liability regime are thus rendered futile 
by this legislation: an extra-contractual action is typically more burdensome for 
the claimant as fault of the third party must be proven in addition to a causation 
nexus between the fault and the damages/loss suffered (furthermore, some legal 
systems recognize the admissibility of a tortious claim only if the damage 
impinges on a right/interest of the person erga omnes, not a right of credit; see p. 
29), while the contractual claim based on the carriage of goods by sea is less 
onerous as it will suffice for the claimant to prove that a specific damage 
occurred while the goods were under the control of the carrier (so-called period 
of liability), thus avoiding the difficult proof of the causal connection.  
Despite the more onerous nature of the extra-contractual action, this claim 
would have been certainly preferred to the one based on contract as it would not 
have been governed by the uniform rules affording the carrier´s limitations to 
the third party and resulting in a possibility for the cargo interest of recovering 
the full amount of his loss. 
Summing up, it can be said that the extension of the carrier´s defenses and 
limitations to the servants and agents has eliminated the difference between the 
two liability regimes applicable following a contractual claim and an extra-
contractual one, and, as a result, also deprived cargo interests of the incentive, 
represented by the extra-contractual recourse itself, of pursuing their claim 
against such named third parties.  
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2.2.1 Rationale behind Himalaya clause and uniform law protection of third parties 
The introduction of this protection was justified by the fact that if a cargo 
interest wanted to recover damages his claim could have been subject to 
different regimes and outcomes depending on what party he directed his action 
against: if he pursued the carrier for the damages caused by its servants/agents, 
the carrier would have been able to shield itself behind the limitations of liability, 
even in the context of vicarious liability, whereas the servant would have been 
exposed to full liability.  
This point and in general the difference in the regulation of the liabilities 
described above, created an unequal field that had to be addressed also because 
it would have exposed the servant/agent, typically an economically less strong 
subject than the carrier, to a high and onerous claim for the fault that even 
though he committed, was the result of the entrepreneurial activity of the carrier 
where the latter and not the former ought to suffer the risks thereof.  
But a closer look at the rationale of this measure reveals that its purpose is not to 
protect the servant against the carrier (encouraging a channeling of all actions 
against the carrier, which is realized by this feature alongside with other ones 
like the circular indemnity clause, also contained in the Himalaya clause, or 
vicarious liability), rather to protect the carrier itself which will ultimately 
benefit from such (contractual and legislative) provision: as a matter of fact, the 
risk of exposing servants and agents to high claims (and hold them liable for 
them) would translate in higher business costs for the carriers as the high 
liabilities of the servants would have to be compensated by the carriers and 
higher insurance costs would be applied by the insurers. It comes then as no 
surprise that the extension of the carrier´s liability to its servants/agents was 
first contained in a contract and only subsequently appeared in the legislation, as 
the contract is the expression of the direct and closest interests of the parties 
involved in the trade.  
 
2.3.1 Legitimacy of the Himalaya clause with respect to the period of responsibility 
of the Hague-Visby and Hamburg rules  
The above considerations on the uncertainties surrounding the exact extent of 
the category of servants/agents highlight how it is still relevant to include a 
 15 
Himalaya clause for the protection of third parties involved in different fashions 
in the carriage of goods by sea (especially relevant for those third parties not 
protected under the rules).  Nevertheless, the effect of a Himalaya clause 
extending the carrier´s statutory protection to all third parties involved in the 
carriage (in the specimen clause provided in this contribution, the third parties 
are referred to as “Servant”) cannot always be legitimate in light of the so-called 
period of responsibility of the carrier. The actions of the third parties must come 
within the remit of the execution of the obligations of carriage assumed by the 
carrier: the delimitation of this scope is also to be coordinated with the period of 
responsibility of the carrier, which is the period under which the carrier can 
assume obligations (and liabilities can arise) with regards to the activities of the 
carriage of goods. This period varies in the different conventions, thus expanding 
the number and types of different obligations imputed to the carrier under the 
contract of carriage. This means that a larger scope of activities are deemed to be 
part of the carriage (for the purposes of the liability of the carrier, its servants or 
independent contractors), thus acknowledging the carriage as an operation not 
consisting in just the transfer of goods from one point to another, but as a multi-
faceted operation where different activities are conducted.  It is in light of this 
that the different conventions are to be read in their attempt to recognize the 
new developments of the commercial activities related to the carriage of goods 
and provide legal protection to this activity18. 
The Hague-Visby rules determine the period of responsibility from the moment 
the loading has commenced to the time the goods are discharged from the vessel 
(Art 1, definition of carriage of goods: so-called “tackle-to-tackle” period); Art 2 
Hague-Visby rules confirms this interpretation by naming the operations relating 
to which the immunities and rights regarding the liability of the carrier apply, 
thus excluding the operations of the third parties that act before the loading 
and/or after the discharge19. This means that port operators might not be 
protected if their activities either precede the loading or follow the discharge. Art 
                                                        
18 See p. 46 to compare different views contained in chapter “Coordination of 
Himalaya clause with other contracts” 
19 Art 2: ‘‘in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and 
discharge of such goods’’ 
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7 of the Hague-Visby rules confirms this approach as it provides for freedom of 
contract when admissible for the parties to the contract of carriage outside this 
period: the carrier and the receiver will have a bill of lading that will not be 
governed by the uniform rules outside the period of liability of the rules and will 
be able to freely agree terms of liability and exclusions (taking also in account 
though that national laws governing this part of the carriage might be mandatory 
and thus reduce the free will of the parties).   
The period of responsibility of the Hamburg rules includes not only the period 
from the loading to the discharging but also the phases prior to the loading 
and/or subsequent to the discharge of the goods but while the carrier still is in 
charge (“sous sa garde”) of the goods (Art 4(1)); this timeframe of responsibility 
is also referred to as “port-to-port” period. Art 4(2) tries to define precisely the 
moment in which the overtaking of goods in charge of the carrier takes place: the 
goods enter under the custody of the carrier the moment he receives them from 
the shipper or a public authority (according to the public laws applicable to the 
port of loading). These operations have to be carried out in the port area, so 
operations that are functional to the carriage but take place outside of the port 
will not be considered under the period of cover. The same applies to the end of 
the period of liability of the carrier. Thus it follows that the servant or agent who 
is employed at an inland point will not enjoy the regime of rights and immunities 
afforded to the carrier under the Hamburg Convention. This is confirmed by the 
definition of “contract of carriage by sea” contained in Art 1(6), where the 
carriage is to be regarded (for the purposes of the application of the convention) 
as “from one port to another”20. 
From all of the above, it flows that, a Himalaya clause that extends the carrier´s 
protection onto independent contractors21, will not be admissible as it would 
confer benefits typical of the contract in which it is contained to a situation 
which is not part of the contract: the contract of carriage when regulated by the 
                                                        
20 See also p. 229, “Impact of the Rotterdam Rules on the Himalaya Clause”, Jason 
Chua 
21 But also when such clause aims at completely excluding the liability of the 
third party, see below p. 29 
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Hague-Visby rules will not admit port phases under its remit, and thus a clause 
that purports to extend the carrier´s defenses and limitations of liability to 
independent contractors will not be applied with regards to the fact that 
independent contractors consume their activities most typically in port areas 
assisting in loading and discharging, thus, once again, outside the scope of 
application of the contract of carriage with all its terms and clauses (among 
which, the Himalaya clause).  The Hamburg rules, on the other hand, introduced 
a wider period of responsibility for the carrier, hence seem to open up for the 
possibility of protecting, by means of a Himalaya clause, independent contractors 
that carry out their operations in the port areas22. 
It is clear how then, if the Himalaya clause can overcome the difficulties 
presented by the dichotomy servants/agents vis-à-vis independent contractors, 
it cannot overcome the challenges posed by the period of responsibility, at least 
when such period is very limited as it is in the Hague-Visby rules. Case law that 
proves the impact of the period of responsibility on a Himalaya clause that 
purports to protect terminal operators consists in an instance in which a national 
court rejected the clause on grounds of its inapplicability to third parties outside 
the scope of the contract come from Italy23: in this case, the Court of Appeal 
adopted an exact interpretation of the Hague-Visby rules – the international 
convention applicable to the case at hand which involved an international 
carriage -  where, according to Art 1 (e), the carriage is a tackle-to-tackle one thus 
excluding the validity of the specific Himalaya clause which aimed at protecting a 
terminal operator of the port of Genoa whose activities took place prior to the 
loading of the goods.  
The research of this contribution focuses on the possibilities of protecting third 
parties by the Himalaya contractual clause and the legal implications that it 
brings about vis-à-vis the uniform rules; it must be submitted that, where the 
international uniform rules do not regulate and do not prohibit limitations of 
liability (namely independent contractors and their liability), it is also possible 
                                                        
22 See Sze Ping-fat, ibid. p. 29 
23 Corte Appello Genova 18 january 2003, Zurich International v Terminal 
Contenitori 
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for States signatories of the conventions to adopt national legislation aimed at 
protecting such parties: this can have a repercussion at national level also on the 
Himalaya clause, the need of which might be diminished in presence of national 
statutes that already protect third parties. It can be of practical benefit to recall 
two different solutions adopted in certain European countries: the example from 
the Scandinavian countries stands out for its own peculiar feature of extending 
the carrier´s protection to all subjects for which the carrier is vicariously liable: 
as the effect of the Visby protocol, Section 282 was introduced in the Norwegian 
Maritime Code24, thus protecting also stevedores under the rules that the 
convention provides for the carrier (and the servants/agents)25.  
Other notable examples are the French legislation, which enacted a specific 
national act for the protection of stevedores, providing for their total immunity 
against cargo interests and liability only towards their principal for damages to 
the goods26.  The protection of stevedores and other terminal operators 
contained in the Scandinavian and French systems are not found in other 
significant legislations as the German and Dutch ones, which only cover crew, 
ship-owner and servants of the carrier27. 
 The difficult construction of the categories of servants/agents and independent 
contractors imposed by the Hague Visby rules and the ensuing uncertainty as to 
the liability regime of important players in the shipping commerce, inspired the 
sector operators to adopt an international convention.  The UNCITRAL 
Convention approved in Vienna in 1991 was the outcome of this process, an 
international uniform law act meant to govern, among others, the liability 
aspects of port operators (the name of the convention was in fact United Nations 
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International 
Trade). Unfortunately the conventions did not enter into force for lack of a 
sufficient number of ratifications. 
                                                        
24 The corresponding provision in the Swedish text can be found in section 13.32 
of the Maritime Code 
25 Falkanger, Bull, Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law, 2004, p 332 
26 W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, p.1899 
27 F. Smeele, The Maritime Perfoming Party in the Rotterdam Rules, 2009, p. 6 
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2.3.2 Rotterdam rules protection and the period of responsibility  
The observations put forward with regards to the specific categories of third 
parties and the period of liability regulated under the Hague-Visby rules and the 
Hamburg rules cannot apply also to the Rotterdam rules as this international 
legislative instrument introduces significant changes, especially with regards to 
the position of third parties to the carriage of goods.  
These rules abandon the dichotomy servant/agent versus independent 
contractor and introduce the one between maritime performing party and non 
maritime performing party (see Arts 1(7) and 19).  Art 1(7) describes the 
maritime performing party as a person other than the carrier who performs the 
carriage obligations “during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port 
of loading … and their departure from the port of discharge”: it follows that the 
performing parties (Art. 1(6)) whose operations are not entirely exhausted 
within the port area and/or contain inland elements are non maritime 
performing parties and their liability will not be governed under Art. 19 (they 
will not benefit from the exclusion of liability regime of the carrier and other 
maritime performing parties).  It follows that terminal operators and other 
entities which work at sea (like ocean carrier) are now covered under the new 
convention, without the need for a Himalaya clause for them.  Carrier´s 
employees and crew and master are considered maritime performing parties but 
cannot be sued under the same conditions applicable to other maritime 
performing parties (Art 20(4)).  
 What is interesting to emphasize is that the position of third parties to the 
carriage (whose activity is exhausted in the sea part of the carriage) is now 
regulated, as for their liability28 within the rules, as opposed to the previous 
conventions on carriage of goods by sea which only extended some defenses and 
limitations to some specific third parties when sued in tort.  
Furthermore, Art 1(1) provides for a wider notion of contract of carriage as it 
“shall provide for carriage by sea and may provide for carriage by other modes of 
                                                        
28 Also with regards to imposing liability, not just limiting it, see Art 20 which 
holds the maritime performing party directly jointly and severally liable together 
with the carrier 
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transport in addition to the sea carriage”. The rules present themselves as a door-
to-door convention, a multimodal transport convention that applies if there is a 
maritime leg of the carriage (so not a multimodal stricto sensu but a “wet 
muldimodal transportation”). In this sense, Art 5 (general scope of application) 
and Art. 12(1) (period of responsibility of the carrier) make it evident that the 
period of responsibility runs from the moment the goods are taken over into 
custody until when the goods are delivered to the receiver; the place of receipt 
and the place of delivery might not necessarily coincide with the port of loading 
or discharging. This means that the rules do not limit their application to the 
maritime section of the carriage, but include also the other phases of the 
multimodal transport with regards to the liability of the carrier: the maritime 
performing party will be liable under a different period, i.e. under 19(1)(b). The 
carrier and the shipper, under Art 12(3), can introduce a tackle-to-tackle period, 
and this would also impact the maritime performing party´s period of liability. 
Performing parties that are not maritime performing parties find themselves in a 
position in which their liability is not governed under the rules: the rules do not 
exclude the possibility of bringing direct claims against them by the cargo 
interests and the rules do not provide any defenses to them (but the rules do not 
prohibit that they limit their liability contractually: their position is very similar 
in this regard to the one of the independent contractors under the Hague-Visby 
rules); the liability regime of these third parties will be governed by other 
relevant (national or even international) rules applicable to the obligations and 
operations undertaken by them: this does not exclude the applicability of a 
Himalaya clause contained in a contract of carriage directed to benefit these 
third parties: as noted above, the difficulties of the period of responsibility of the 
carrier posed by the other conventions are now overcome as it is possible for a 
contractual clause to explicate its effects at any stage of the carriage included in 
the door-to-door time frame. Thus an inland carrier (a performing party that is 
not a maritime performing party) will still be able to benefit from a Himalaya 
clause extending to him the defenses and limitations of the carrier under the 
Rotterdam rules. Such limitation of liability of the inland carrier will have to be 
coordinated with other potentially applicable overriding set of rules governing 
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the inland carrier´s operations. Furthermore, it is to be added that a Himalaya 
clause that limits the liability of an inland carrier (by extending to him the 
carrier´s benefits) will ultimately benefit the carrier by reducing its vicarious 
liability (Art 18), yet this clause would not enter in conflict with Art 79(1), since 
the rules do not govern the liability of the non maritime performing party and 
leave its regulation to national laws: the Himalaya clause is in this point thus 
legitimate29.  
In conclusion, it must be noted how the reach of the Rotterdam rules, both in 
terms of the period of liability of the carrier and the subjective scope of 
application of the carrier´s defenses to a much wider group of third parties, has 
almost set aside the need for a Himalaya clause, as it has been also argued by 
many scholars30: what is important to stress in this context is though what the 
actual aim of the Himalaya clause is. It is not only to extend the carrier´s benefits 
to third parties, but, first of all, to attempt at regulating the actual liability of the 
third party by granting it a total exclusion of liability: this is clearly stated in the 
first sub-paragraph of the clause and should not be underestimated also in light 
of the fact, that, despite that uniform rules do not regulate the liability of 
servants/agents (in the Hague-Visby and Hamburg rules) or employee of the 
maritime performing parties and the master and the crew of the vessel 
(Rotterdam rules), some national legislations may approve the first sub-
paragraph of the clause as they allow waivers of tortious liability also towards 
third parties31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 A. von Ziegler et al , The Rotterdam Rules 2008, p. 334 
30 R. Williams, “The Overall Impact of the Rotterdam Rules on the Liability of 
Multimodal Carriers and their Subcontractors” in “Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land 
and Air”, 2014, p. 217 
31 see Chapter 3 
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3 Contract for the benefit of a third party as the model for the 
Himalaya clause under civil law  
 
Most of the conflict that has surrounded the Himalaya clause in almost all of the 
years of its existence in the realm of common law, has been centered around the 
admissibility of a clause that, in order to achieve its effects, necessarily derogates 
from the doctrine of privity of contract.  
The civil law legal system acknowledges as well the principle of the relativity of 
contract, meaning that its effects are relative (as opposed to absolute/erga 
omnes) and binding only for the parties that entered into that given agreement. 
However, most civil law countries did not have a great deal of difficulty in 
accepting the legal effects of the clause as they were familiar with the legal 
device of the “stipulation for another”32.  Perhaps the only doubts (apart from the 
ones raised by the author Tetley, see below) seem addressed to the possibility of 
the benefit being an exclusion of liability clause.  
This chapter will discuss these topics and will try to add also new perspectives 
suggested by some scholars in different jurisdictions as to alternative contractual 
models under which consider the Himalaya clause.   
                                                        
32 Henceforth referred to also as “contract to the benefit of a third party” 
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3.1 Structure of the contract for the benefit of a third party 
The contract for the benefit of a third party consists in an agreement between a 
promisee/stipulator and a promisor: the promisor obliges himself to the 
counterparty (the promisee) to perform an obligation for the benefit of said third 
party (the beneficiary)33 : the third party does not assume obligations but is able, 
under this contract, to acquire only rights/benefits.  
The conferment of only rights and benefits to the third party (basically situations 
that imply only advantages and not burdens for the beneficiary) is the reason 
behind the admissibility of this legal device notwithstanding the derogation to 
the principle of relativity of contracts34.  
More specifically, the third party will never become a party to the contract, but 
once the stipulation is valid and in force and (for the jurisdictions that require 
this) the third party has accepted the contract, then he will acquire the right to 
the performance and the right to enforce such performance in case the promisor 
has not fulfilled his obligation (the beneficiary will be empowered with a 
contractual action against the promisor; see the different national civil code´s 
articles recalled above).  
According to the structure of the stipulation for another, in the context of the 
Himalaya clause contained in a contract of carriage of goods by sea, the party 
committing itself to the performance of the promissory obligation (the promisor) 
is the cargo interest, which holds that no liability will be attributed to the third 
party, or that limitations of liability will be recognized to this party [[this 
promise follows from both the first paragraph of the clause an the second one]]; 
the promisee, the subject receiving the promise object of the stipulation, is the 
carrier and finally, the beneficiary is the group represented by the third parties 
                                                        
33 For a brief overview of some relevant national legislation see the following 
articles in the corresponding national civil codes: Art 1121 France, Art 1121 
Belgium, Art 1411 Italy, Art 1257 Spain, Art 1446 Québec 
34 The acquisition of rights only, and not of obligations/duties, is also the reason 
why most authors reject the idea that, if the Himalaya clause is to be construed 
as a contract for the benefit of a third party, the agreement concerning the 
jurisdiction and arbitration clause ought not to be part of the clause as it is not 
possible to construe it under the category now described for the obligations it is 
liable to impose, see sub-clause (b) of the specimen Himalaya clause 
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contemplated in the clause (servants, agents and much more, see clause 
provided). 
 
3.2 Requirements for the validity of the stipulation 
The stipulation is valid only so long as the stipulator has an interest in providing 
a benefit to a third party: the interest can be a financial interest just as a moral 
interest. In the carriage of goods, excluded the occurrence of a moral interest, the 
carrier will have an interest in providing the third party with a benefit when 
there is between them a relationship, based on which the carrier/stipulator is 
the debtor of the third party/beneficiary: this can well be if between them there 
is an agreement that provides the liability of the carrier towards the 
servant/independent contractor when the latter is held liable by the cargo 
receiver (for damages occurred to the cargo). This is often the case, as most 
employment contracts and service contracts between the carrier and 
respectively the employee or subcontractor will contain indemnity clauses by 
virtue of which the carrier is to indemnify the employee/subcontractor for 
liability incurred against third parties.  
For the existence of the interest it is not necessarily required a prior obligation 
from the stipulator towards the beneficiary: this obligation can well arise after 
the stipulation of the contract. This is true for the life insurance contract, where 
the person taking out insurance is to benefit a third party (his relatives; here the 
interest has a moral base not a monetary one) when the death-event will strike; 
alike is the Himalaya clause, where the liability of the carrier towards the servant 
arises (this is the obligation relationship between the carrier and the 
servant/independent contractor) when the damages occur (so there is not debt 
from the carrier to the servant until this moment).   
The Italian Court of Cassation (the highest instance in Italy for civil and criminal 
matters) has found, for example, the interest of the carrier to introduce a benefit 
for a third party to have an economical nature, as the carrier can obtain more 
favorable negotiation terms if it provides for the protection of its servants and 
independent contractors by extending to them a contractual protection in the 
form of exclusion of liability: the protection of independent contractor will imply 
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a reduced need for insurance and lower insurance costs which also will turn into 
a commercial benefit for the carrier35. 
The Canadian author Tetley indicates other requirements necessary for the 
validity of the contract: they are the presence of a valid contract at the base of 
the stipulation, a third party/beneficiary that must exist or be determinable at 
the moment the promisor executes the performance of the stipulation and the 
acceptance of the third party to the receipt of the beneficial performance of the 
contract.   
The author casts doubts on the sufficient determination of the third party 
beneficiary, as it is suggested that the clause is often drafted in such a way to 
include a multitude of different classes of beneficiaries, not belonging to a 
homogenous group and thus not clearly identifiable: some of the beneficiaries 
are in fact direct employees of the carrier, others are under its supervision, while 
even other ones are only contracted for a specific operation and not under the 
direct supervision of the carrier: the loose nature of this category of beneficiary 
would negatively impact the certainty of legal relationships and the identity of 
the parties involved in the stipulation36.  
Furthermore, it seems that the stipulation for a third party confers the right to 
the performance of the obligation in the contract but also the right to enforce 
towards the promisor such obligation in case the performance is not carried out: 
in the context of the Himalaya clause, there is no positive conduct that is 
expected from the consignee but on the contrary, a restraint from doing 
something, either not to sue the third party or not to hold the third party liable 
for the damages caused (either not to hold the third party liable at all, as follows 
from the first paragraph of the Himalaya clause, or not to hold the party liable 
beyond the limitations to its liability, which is the second sub-clause).  
This situation creates an apparent contradiction between the contract for the 
benefit of a third party and the Himalaya clause: this is further elaborated by 
Tetley by recourse to the figurative images of the destruction of a right and the 
even more evocative “sword” picture: in the first case, his focus centers on the 
                                                        
35 A. Antonini, Liability of Terminal Operators, Case History and Case Law, 2008,  
p. 114 
36 W. Tetley, The Himalaya Clause – Heresy of Genius?, p. 1894 
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stipulation for a third party as a device to confer positive rights (as in the sector 
of automobile and life insurance) that can be directly enforced by the beneficiary, 
whereas in the Himalaya clause, the third party can only be granted a negative 
right to deprive the cargo owner of the cargo claim (when the Himalaya clause 
provides for total exclusion of liability) or to limit the amount recoverable (when 
the clause sets the that the limit of liability applicable to the servant is the same 
as the one of the carrier), thus effectively “destroying” (totally or partially) the 
claims and rights of the receiver.  
The sword picture in stead expresses the defense mechanism upon which the 
Himalaya clause rests, as it is not meant to confer a situation from which, on its 
own initiative the third party can enforce a right but to give it a defense (as if it 
was a sword) once the consignee has decided to pursue his claim.  
Despite the view of this author, it must be stated that the thesis of the Himalaya 
clause as a contract for the benefit of a third party is not challenged under the 
civil law system countries and that examples of case will now follow also as to 
the possibility of the benefit of the clause being an exclusion/reduction of 
liability.  
 
3.3 Exclusion/restriction of liability as object of the contract for the benefit 
of a third party 
This paragraph will not focus on the legitimacy of excluding tortious liability for 
negligent conduct against third parties (Chapter 3 of this contribution will deal 
with this matter), rather if, according to the rules on the contract for the benefit 
of a third party, it is possible to include in the benefit that the stipulation confers 
on a third party an exclusion/restriction of liability: the view of the author Tetley 
has been presented above also as to the lack of requirements that the Himalaya 
clause suffers from. Some national legislation examples and case will be now 
presented to support the idea of the appropriateness of the incorporation of the 
Himalaya clause under the stipulation for another.   
Many systems that provide in their legislation for contractual third party rights, 
admit that the right attributed to the beneficiary can consist also of the right to 
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enforce a clause that excludes or limits liability37 but just a handful of legislations 
expressly provide for it, among which the English law by Section 1(6) of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 or the Dutch civil code. Art 6.257 
NBW (Dutch Civil Code) expressly provides that if in a contract one of the parties 
is exempted for contractual or tortious liability of the subordinates, even the 
latter ones can then invoke the liability exemption if a direct claim is brought 
against them, as if they were party to the contract; the provision expressly 
requires that the exemption extended to the third party pertain to the liability of 
the employer and/or of the subordinate; if the exemption is provided only for the 
employer then the subordinate will not be able to claim the defenses. 
Comparative law authors have praised the introduction of such provision in the 
Dutch civil code, as it rests upon the rationale that, by extending the 
exemptions/limitations to the subordinates38, it preempts the scenario where 
the employees proceed against the employer which would then deprive the 
liability exemption clauses of their meaning and purpose39. 
The contract to the benefit of a third party confers a right, but is has been 
acknowledged by courts that such stipulation can also have as its object the 
waiver of a right of action40. 
The construction of the Himalaya clause under the rules of the stipulation for 
another have thus been upheld in many countries: to cite but a few, the German 
Highest Court declared that a third party should be protected according to the 
mechanisms of the contract for the benefit of a third party even if the underlying 
contract of carriage does not contain an express term for its protection: the 
implicit protection stems from an interpretation by the court of the contract´s 
purposes, among which is the protection of the carrier that is realized to a better 
extent if the third party is not held liable, or if the third party´s liability enjoys 
                                                        
37 See Unidroit, Art. 5.2.3 of the Principles of International Commercial Contracts: 
these are principles of international commercial contract drafted by the “Institut 
international pour l'unification du droit privé”, an international organization with 
the objective of harmonizing private international law 
38 The code refers to “subordinates”, implying thus an employment relationship, 
which, in the context of the carriage of goods by sea, renders the provision 
applicable to crew members, and other subjects which are employed by the 
carrier 
39 Kortmann-Faber, Contracts and Third Parties, p. 248 
40 Italian Corte di Cassazione C76/2663, C 69/23343 
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limitations: it is interesting to notice how the application of the general rules on 
limitation of liability clauses did not lead in this case to a restrictive 
interpretation of the subjective scope of the beneficiaries41; the previous case is 
based on the leading case heard as well by the German Bundesgerichtshof, which 
stated that the master of the vessel was not to be held liable [[see Judgment of 
July 7, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof, 1960 M.D.R. 907 (W.Ger.); for further references 
to (West) German case law concerning the admissibility of the Himalaya clause, 
see M. Sturley, International Uniform Law in National Courts: the Influence of 
Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 Virginia Journ. Intl law, 729 
(1987)]]. Italian case law also validated the Himalaya clause under the rules of 
the contract to the third party without particular difficulties [[see Tribunale 
Genova 20 November 2000 in Dir. Marittimo 2002, p 98942. Italian case law also 
validated the Himalaya clause under the rules of the contract to the third party 
without particular difficulties43. 
The case Miles international v Federal Commerce& Navigation and stevedoring 
comes from Québec44, the superior court of Québec applied Art 1029 of the Civil 
Code of Québec to the case45. In this case the terminal operator availed himself of 
the Himalaya clause contained in the bill of lading released by the carrier, in 
order to oppose the claim of total compensation for the damages brought by the 
cargo owner: the goods disappeared in the period during which they were kept 
in the storage rooms by the terminal operator while waiting to be loaded 
onboard: the Québec Superior Court in order to give the clause full validity and 
the possibility for the terminal agent to benefit from the limitation of liability, 
turned to the “stipulation for another” provision, contemplated in Art 1029 of the 
                                                        
41 In the subject matter, the case dealt with the direct liability of a sub-carrier, 
Judgment of Apr. 28, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof, 1977 M.D.R. 819, (W.Ger.) 
42 See Judgment of July 7, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof, 1960 M.D.R. 907 (W.Ger.); for 
further references to (West) German case law concerning the admissibility of the 
Himalaya clause, see M. Sturley, International Uniform Law in National Courts: the 
Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 Virginia Journ. Intl law, 
729 (1987) Italian case law also validated the Himalaya clause under the rules of 
the contract to the third party without particular difficulties [[see Tribunale 
Genova 20 November 2000 in Dir. Marittimo 2002, p 989 
43 Tribunale Genova 20 November 2000 in Dir. Marittimo 2002, p 989 
44 A Canadian province with a civil law tradition 
45 Miles International Co. v. Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. and federal 
Stevedoring Ltd. [1978] 1 Lloyd´s Rep 
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Québec Civil Code. 
Further endorsement of the construction of this clause under the rules of the 
contract in favor of third parties comes from Art. 5.2.3 of the UNIDROIT 
principles, where the Himalaya clause is expressly referred to under the section 
on third party rights.   
 
3.4 Alternative contractual approaches 
It is worthy to point out positions of the doctrine that, while remaining less 
main-stream, hold an interesting point of view. They admit the validity of the 
Himalaya clause but slightly depart from the structure of the contract to the 
benefit of a third party and construe the agreement under different sets of rules. 
An Italian current of thought places the clause within the category of the 
negotiorum gestio, a Roman law tradition quasi-contractual situation where one 
party (negotiorum gestor or manager) acts for the benefit of a subject (dominus 
negotii or owner) without having received from the latter a delegation or 
mandate to so perform but does so in the party´s interest46. In letter (d) of the 
Himalaya clause provided under the web-site link, it is specified that the carrier 
is to be considered as acting as agent of the third party: the latter remains thus 
the owner of the affairs (negotium) that has as its object the conferral of specific 
benefits to his advantage. The contract to the benefit of a third party, instead, 
does not provide for one subject to act on behalf of another and thus leaves room 
for the interpretation at hand47. 
Under civil law, this solution seems also preferable to the one of the 
authorization to represent or act on one´s behalf which would be applicable to 
sub-paragraph (d) of the clause, as it would avoid the difficulties of proving the 
existence of the mandate from the third party (the principal) to the carrier (the 
agent) to represent him (needed under the rules on mandate). This 
interpretation seems plausible if based on a literal interpretation of the clause, 
but it would seem to forget that the Himalaya clause has developed in the 
                                                        
46 See Art 709 German BGB, Art 1370 French Civil Code, Art 2028 Italian Civil 
Code, Art 2292 Lousiana Civil Code, to recall but a few; it is interesting to note 
how negotiorum gestio is undisputedly the contractual basis for another 
significant set of rules typical of the maritime sector, namely salvage 
47 See more on this: W. Tetley, Proving the Contract or Tort, p. 17 
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common law realm, where the sub-paragraph that provides for the agency 
relationship between the carrier and the third party is meant to bypass the 
obstacles of the privity of contract.    
A second approach provided by some authors 48  suggests that a better 
contractual model that would fit the peculiarities of the Himalaya clause is the 
contract with a performance for a third party49: a contract between a carrier and 
a receiver where the third party is only the beneficiary of an activity to its favor 
and has a non- actionable/enforceable position towards the obligor (the cargo 
receiver). This is different from the contract to the benefit of a third party where 
the beneficiary is also entitled to enforce the obligation created by the 
contractual parties to its favor. It follows that, if the injured party (the cargo 
receiver) does indeed claim the amount of damages against the third party 
beneficiary of the Himalaya provision, it will be breaching the contract in the 
part where it promises not to pursue recovery directly from the third party and, 
as a consequence, the stipulator (the carrier) will have an action for breach of 
contract against the cargo receiver. An interesting point is then whether the 
cargo receiver will be nevertheless able to recover damages from the third party, 
despite his breach of contract, since the third party will not have an opposable 
exception against the claimant (as a result of empowering the third party only 
with a benefit to a performance of an obligation, not a right to enforce the 
promise). It seems that this interpretation would reduce the Himalaya clause per 
se to a circular indemnity clause, thus maybe missing the true essence of its 
purpose50. 
This construction seems though to be more in agreement with the thesis 
propounded by Tetley where his position was that the Himalaya clause does not 
confer a position from which to enforce the right object of the promise.   
                                                        
48 See A. Antonini, Trattato Breve Diritto Marittimo, Vol. II, 2008, p. 289 
49 This type of contract is not found in the Italian civil code but has been 
elaborated by the Italian case-law and has very similar effects to the contract 
with protective effects for a third party, product of the German jurisprudence: 
see A. Antonini, ibid 
50 For a discussion on the circular indemnity clause, see p. 42 
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One more alternative solution has been adopted in Germany, with regards to the 
admissibility of a benefit that amounts to an exclusion clause51: this has been 
debated by scholars as the German provision on the contract to the benefit of a 
third party (Art 328 BGB) explicitly refers to an actionable right of the 
beneficiary while it does not make any reference to the instrument of (invoking 
of) an exception. In order to overcome this obstacle the German case-law has 
resorted to the legal institute of the pactum de non petendo, meaning that the 
liability exclusion clause negotiated by the parties imposes an obligation on the 
injured party not to proceed even against the servants of the counterparty52.  
Other German scholars sustain the thesis that the pactum de non petendo is to be 
preferred to the contract in favor of a third party, as the beneficiary has only a 
plea against the claim of the cargo interests53.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
51 Despite the fact that previous case law, see above, did not dwell on this point, 
recent scholars have suggested the different approach consisting in the pactum 
de non petendo. 
52 See the leading case on point adjudged by the Bundesgerichtshof, 7 December 
1961 and commented in Neue Jur. Wochenschrift, 1962, p. 388; for the pactum de 
non petendo see Koetz Flessner, European Contract Law, p.258. 
53 See Nicolai Lagoni, The Liability of Classification Societies, 2007, p. 283 
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4 Exclusion of liability clauses 
 
4.1 General remarks on exclusion clauses and different liability aspects 
This chapter will focus on the sub-term under letters (a) and (b) of the Himalaya 
clause where respectively, a total exclusion of liability of the third party and a 
restriction of the liability of the third party are envisaged.  
This chapter will discuss the validity of these sub-clauses from the perspective of 
the rules applicable in the context of exclusion/limitation of liability clauses54.  
These clauses consist in terms/agreements the source thereof being contracts 
where one party aims at limiting or even completely excluding its own liability 
for the losses caused while executing the contract. Such agreements can also 
                                                        
54 These clauses can be invariably referred to as limitation, exception, disclaimer, 
non-responsibility, or restriction clauses. 
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purport to exclude the liability of a third party, typically an employee of the 
contractual party.  
These agreements are very common in commercial practice, not confined to the 
shipping sector only, and find often a mandatory national regulation in many 
countries: this regulation is often in place to dictate the limits to which such 
agreements can be negotiated, in order to prevent unreasonable and unfair 
terms and in order to protect the interests of the party against which these 
limitations are stipulated55.    
Many different clauses can provide for the limitation of the liability of the carrier: 
our focus will be on the validity of the Himalaya clause, as the typical clause for 
the exclusion or limitation of the liability (not of the carrier but) of the third 
party to the contract of carriage.  
The Himalaya clause is not to be confused under this point with a clause that 
restricts the liability of the employer (the carrier) for the damages caused by its 
servants; the liability of the employer is in this case vicarious liability, and it 
often cannot be restricted: in the case of the Conventions, the carrier cannot limit 
his liability, not even his vicarious liability beyond what the rules of the 
conventions allow56; the Himalaya clause instead, is set out to exclude the 
liability of a servant for its own conduct, but is contained in a contract to which 
the servant is not a party (meaning that the liability limitation is “negotiated” by 
the carrier). Therefore the liability of the servant towards the injured party will 
be an extra-contractual liability: such liability arises out of the performance of 
the service/employment contract that the servant has with the carrier, but the 
activities of this contract are connected to the execution of the carriage contract. 
This type of extra-contractual liability is referred to, by some authors, as 
                                                        
55 Often in commercial contracts, the party which such terms can be opposed to 
has less negotiation sway and influence; considerations could be made with 
regards to from unfair contractual terms legislation where contracts are not 
negotiated by the parties and the weaker party, the consumer, adheres to the 
contract drafted by the interest groups representing the business/counterparty, 
could be applicable in this context: this is the case also with bills of lading, see W. 
Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, p. 2088 
56 Art 3(8) Hague-Visby rules, Art 23 Hamburg Rules and Art 79 Rotterdam rules 
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prospective liability57 as it is the kind of liability that is foreseeable as arising in 
the course of the execution of the contract: it can be reasonably predicted by the 
parties to the contract of carriage that the carrier´s servants might themselves 
incur liability towards the cargo interests in the course of the contract of 
carriage: this is also evidenced by the wording of the clause in its first sub-
paragraph where it declaims such liability to be limited to “any act, neglect, 
default on the Servant´s part while acting in the course of or in connection with the 
performance of this contract”. It is important to underline the nature of the 
servant´s liability towards the cargo owner, as a different extra-contractual 
liability on the part of the servant towards the cargo owner might just as well 
arise while not being the result of any activity functionally connected to the 
contract of carriage: the exclusion clause connected in the contract of carriage 
will not apply in this case, despite the identity of the parties. The connection 
between the activities of the servant and the ones needed for the execution of the 
contract of carriage will determine if the third party has acted within the scope 
of obligations or outside of them, thus resulting in him benefiting or not from the 
disclaimer clause: this can happen if the servant acts beyond the sphere of his 
employment (or the independent contractor acts beyond the sphere of the tasks 
delegated to it) and negligently causes damage to the goods58. 
It is also important to draw a distinction between the different ways in which 
contractual liability and extra-contractual liability arise, especially for the 
purposes of this work where the extra-contractual liability of the third party is 
analyzed.  
The validity of the Himalaya clause as a liability exclusion clause will now be 
tested under the general rules on liability exception clauses but also the specific 
regulation provided in the international uniform conventions for carriage by sea.  
 
 
                                                        
57 C. von Bar, Non Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused to Another, 
p. 894 
58 This extra-contractual liability is opposed to the kind of extra-contractual 
liability that is not linked to the performance of the contract and possibly would 
not be excludable by the said contract for lack of the contractual requirements of 
proper consideration or causa. 
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4.2 Regulation of limitation/restriction of liability clauses in international 
uniform law 
All the conventions contain an article that provides for the prohibition for the 
carrier to lessen or relieve his liability beyond the boundaries set by the rules 
contained in the very legislation: this implies that covenants and terms where 
the carrier agrees with the counterparty of the carriage to extend his liability 
limitation to his favor are null and void59.  
The rationale behind the prohibition of exculpatory clauses for the benefit of the 
carrier cannot be the same if the clause is for the benefit of a servant or agent of 
the carrier. As a matter of fact, the conventions do not provide for a prohibition 
of an exclusion or extension of the liability regime to the benefit of the third 
party (except for, the Rotterdam rules which do not allow maritime performing 
parties to relieve their liability beyond the convention´s standards, see above 
p.15). 
The rationale in the first case is to provide a fair balance between rights and 
responsibilities of the carrier towards the shipper: this principle is elaborated in 
Esso Belgium v Nathaniel Bacon60. With respect to the possibility of limiting the 
liability of the servants/agents, the rationale behind this is that the people 
representing these functions are parties that would not be able to cover 
themselves the expenses of “damages beyond their means” especially in case the 
servants are employees of the carrier acting on an individual basis and not as a 
company (as a stevedoring company)61.  
 
                                                        
59 The limitations to the carrier´s liability provided by the conventions are 
similar to one another and it is not allowed for the carrier to “contract out” of 
these limitations and introduce a more favorable liability regime: the Hague-
Visby rules provide for an exclusion of liability under Art 4, the Hamburg 
Convention does so in Art 5, the Rotterdam rules in Art 17; furthermore, the 
carrier benefits in all of the conventions of a “limits of liability” provision, which 
caps to a specific amount of units the amount for which can be held liable in 
proportion to the loss caused 
60 For a more comprehensive analysis of this case and further relevant case-law 
on point, see W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, p. 2085 
61 See Falkanger, Bull, Brautasaret, Scandinavian Maritime Law, 2 ed., p. 331; 
further on the rationale, see above p. 10 
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4.3.1 Exclusion of liability provided by the Himalaya clause: sub-clause letter (a) 
As mentioned above, a Himalaya clause can provide for a different amplitude of 
protection with regards to the exclusion of liability: it can either be drafted as 
providing for a total exclusion of liability of the third party or for an extension of 
the limits and liability benefits of the carrier to the third party62. In most cases, 
though, it will contain both terms, first assessing the total exclusion and then the 
extension of the rights and benefits of the carrier: the two clauses are most often 
linked by the expression “notwithstanding the foregoing” or “without prejudice to 
the foregoing”63, meaning that the two parts operate regardless of each other: the 
first clause offers the widest protection possible as it excludes completely any 
liability of the third party, and therefore it must be assumed that it would absorb 
and include in itself also the extensions of the rights and limitations of the 
carrier64.  
 
The first sub-paragraph of the Himalaya clause provides that “[no servant] shall 
in any circumstances whatsoever be under any liability whatsoever … for any loss, 
damage or delay of whatsoever kind arising or resulting directly or indirectly from 
any act, neglect or default on the servant´s part”. The wording seems to include 
any kind of loss possibly suffered with respect to the goods (delay of delivery, 
loss or damage). 
This sub-paragraph does not mention specifically or distinguish between the 
degree of culpability to which the exclusion is to apply65: however, it can be 
reasonably assumed that the expression “any act, neglect or default”, addresses 
only acts assisted by a negligent conduct. The juxtaposition of the terms “act”, 
“neglect” and “default” ought to be read as referring to the nature of the conduct 
that causes the loss: the loss could then be the result of either a commissive 
                                                        
62 See also above, when discussed the differences between the HC protection and 
the protection of the Convention with regards to the subjective scope of the 
provisions; see N. Gaskell, Bills of Lading: Law and Contract, p. 384, footnote 40: 
the author wonders why more attention has not been focused on the first part of 
the clause which purports to confer a total exclusion of liability, but argues that 
Art 3(8) would make the first part inapplicable. 
63 See model clause referred to in this contribution above at p. 19. 
64 This also means that if the validity of this first provision is recognized, then, a 
fortiori, the second provision will also be valid. 
65 Whereas sub-paragraph (c) mentions “negligence”. 
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conduct (a positive act where the doing of something leads to the loss, identifies 
in the clause as an “act”) or an ommissive one (a conduct where the restraint 
from doing something causes the loss, in the clause the “neglect or default”).  The 
wording of the clause in point is not clear, but many elements suggest that the 
clause should be interpreted in the above-mentioned way: the same wording is 
found also in other standard form versions of the Himalaya clause, present in 
both bills of lading or charter-party agreements (and also similarly in the text of 
the uniform conventions) and the lack of accuracy in the wording can maybe be 
warranted by the fact that such clauses have been historically drafted by 
business parties and not by legal experts66; furthermore, if, based on an a 
contrario reasoning, the clause were to include also intentional behavior on the 
grounds of the generous wording of the text but also of the consideration that the 
cargo interests would nevertheless be able to recover directly the damages from 
the carrier by means of vicarious liability, it should be added that in case of 
doubt as to the extension of the exclusion of liability and of the intention of the 
contractual parties, the common law doctrine has elaborated the contra 
proferentem rule that imposes to construe the term in a restrictive fashion 
against the beneficiary of the term67. This would make it seem improbable that 
the first sub-paragraph, in case a dispute were to arise as to its specific meaning, 
would be granted such a wide interpretation as to include intentional 
conduct/reckless acts.  
Furthermore, two final general observations must be made: the first one is that, 
if the Himalaya clause is contained in a contract of carriage governed by the rules 
of an international convention, the first sub-paragraph would be invalid insofar 
as it allows an exclusion of liability for gross negligence/intentional damage: it 
would collide with Art. 4-bis(4) Hague-Visby rules, Art 8(2) Hamburg rules and 
Art. 61 Rotterdam rules. These rules object to any benefit concerning liability as 
                                                        
66 Doubts as to the degree of culpability that the term aims at covering are raised 
in A. Antonini, Trattato di diritto marittimo, p.291. 
67 See W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, p. 2088; a similar principle applies in the 
civil law jurisdictions, where it is established that all clauses that restrict liability 
are to be given the narrowest possible interpretation 
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a consequence of an intentional or reckless conduct and apply also in case where 
a contractual clause (like the Himalaya clause) would provide otherwise68. 
The second consideration is a policy order argumentation. Public order (more 
often referred to as public policy in common law) is a fundamental rule in most 
countries and refers to a varied set of principles involving the reasonableness, 
justice, fairness and “morality” of the law69. As such, one of its declinations is that 
intentional damage or reckless/gross negligent conduct that leads to loss, should 
not be excluded by the parties, as doing so, would then leave the counterparty 
defenseless against a conduct that is morally reprehensible. A Himalaya clause 
that holds the third party not liable for its intentional conduct to cause loss 
would be caught under this principle and be declared invalid.  
These public order aspects, present in most common and civil law countries, 
would then apply also in cases where the Himalaya clause is contained in a bill of 
lading not governed by the international rules and only under national laws. 
With regards to the effects produced by the exempted negligent conduct of the 
third party, the sub-clause refers to any loss, damage or delay. These damages 
correspond to the ones for which the carrier and the third parties can avail 
themself of the defenses and limitations of liability under the conventions: the 
carrier and third parties cannot avail themself of the defenses of the Hague-Visby 
convention in case of delay (delay is not regulated under this convention).   
The first and second sub-paragraphs of the Himalaya clause is to apply, in light of 
the above, only with regards to negligent conducts: this sub-clause has now to be 
tested under the possibility of providing for a total exclusion of tortious liability 
of a servant/independent contractor towards a third party.  
Public order considerations play a role in this scenario as well: when a 
fundamental right is impinged upon, the clause could be considered inapplicable, 
because the legal order admits interference with or limitation of that right only 
by a legislative act (i.e. when the legal order itself has explicitly provided so) and 
not by the will of the contractual parties. The limit that such exclusion 
encounters is the nature of the right upon which the exclusion/restriction is to 
                                                        
68 The Himalaya clause cannot override a mandatory clause of the contract in 
which it is contained. 
69 See W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, p. 2082 
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be applied, meaning that the violation of an absolute and not disposable right 
should never encounter limitations such as an exclusion of liability for the 
person violating that right. It is debatable if a servant could be able to invoke the 
defense of a Himalaya clause against a cargo interest when the goods are totally 
destroyed or completely lost due to his personal negligence: the international 
conventions attribute liability for this case to the carrier, but do not address the 
position of the servant (only as the beneficiary of the carrier´s exclusions); the 
Rotterdam rules do attribute liability to maritime performing parties, thus 
including third parties involved in the carriage, except for the crew and the 
master of the vessel used for the relevant carriage and employees of the 
maritime performing parties): a Himalaya clause could then be the only shield 
against a direct action from the cargo owner. The solution to this matter could 
then depend on the specific considerations case-by-case made by the courts (for 
instance, what goods were lost, the amount of the goods lost, etc.) and the extent 
of public policy that the specific court adopts70.   
Public order would definitely exclude the applicability of the Himalaya clause in 
a case where the third party had caused physical injury: this case is not relevant 
in the carriage of goods, since the Himalaya clause applies where the claimant is 
the Merchant, but could be relevant in the case where the clause is inserted in a   
transportation of passengers contract  and where the claimant is thus the 
beneficiary of the transportation, i.e. the passenger71: the third party would not 
be exculpated even by evidence of slight negligence on his part72. 
As mentioned, third parties´ liability is not regulated directly by the international 
uniform rules (with the exception of the Rotterdam rules), but, when the identity 
                                                        
70 The “Study Group on a European Civil Code”, a group on the harmonization of 
the private law of the different European countries, suggests that the entity of 
the “legally relevant damage occurred” should be considered: see C. von Bar, 
Non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to another, 2009, p. 894 
71 A Himalaya clause is a popular clause in the shipping and other transportation 
industry and it is also contained in contracts other than carriage of goods: it is 
emblematic in fact that the name given to the clause emerges from a contract of 
transportation of persons by sea, see p. … ; see online link with Himalaya clause 
model for passenger transportation at 
https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Clauses/Himalaya_Clauses_for_Passenger_T
ickets.aspx 
72 E. Peel, Treitel on the Law of Contract, 2003, p. 249 
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of such third party coincides with one of the entities whose liability is regulated 
by the conventions, then the convention will indirectly regulate also this third 
party. This is case for the shipowner that acts as a third party for the purposes of 
the contract of carriage where the carrier is a charterer who has entered into a 
charter-party agreement with the shipowning company. In this case Art 3(8) 
Hague-Visby rules imposes that the liability of the shipowner cannot be limited 
beyond the convention, so it will not be possible for the shipowner to benefit 
from a Himalaya clause where its negligent conduct is exempted totally from 
liability73.  
A similar situation arises under the Hamburg rules when an actual carrier is 
considered the beneficiary of the Himalaya clause: as evidenced above, under the 
concept of “Servant” any third party connected to the carriage would be included 
as the beneficiary. Yet, the liability of the actual carrier cannot be excluded (Art 
10 read in combination with Art 23) for negligent conduct that produces 
damages, delay or loss of the goods (unless an exempting factor intervenes as 
per Art 5 to exclude the liability of the sub-carrier).  
The Rotterdam rules regulate directly the liability of some third parties that are 
defined as maritime performing parties (Art 7): these parties can be well acting 
within the concept of “Servant” of the specimen Himalaya clause reproduced in 
this work: the first sub-paragraph of this clause will not exclude the liability of 
such parties (in accordance with Art 79) beyond what the Art 17 (basis for 
liability) provides for the maritime performing carrier (Art 17´s basis for liability 
is applicable to the maritime performing party by virtue of Art 19).  
The above-mentioned instances reappear in the context of the circular indemnity 
clause where the total exclusion of liability conferred by the clauses would 
collide with the third parties if their liability is regulated under the 
conventions74. 
 
                                                        
73 The rationale of the inclusion of the shipowner in the Hague-Visby rules in the 
context of the carriage contract is to empower the cargo interests with one more 
entity, other than the carrier, against which to direct cargo claims, so to 
guarantee the satisfaction of the claim of the cargo owner. 
74 See below p. 42 
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4.3.2. Exclusion of liability provided by the Himalaya clause: sub-clause letter (b) 
The second sub-paragraph of the Himalaya clause has been already discussed in 
the previous chapter: it will be recalled nevertheless in this context as to the 
applicability of general rules on exclusion clauses to it.  
Whenever the national rules admit the tortious liability of the third party for 
loss, damage or delay in delivery of the goods, this clause could be relevant in 
relieving some of the liability of the said party. This clause confers to the third 
party the same protection that the carrier receives under the conventions that 
regulate the bill of lading that contains the Himalaya clause.  
The conventions extend specific defenses and limitations of liability to the 
carrier in presence of loss, delay and damage to the goods: the same basis for 
liability applies to the third party, as Art 7(2) Hamburg rules states that the third 
party is to benefit of these provisions when faced by an action as the one of Art. 
7(1). The same is provided under Art 4-bis(2) which refers to the same type of 
action (an action for damages or loss of cargo) brought against the carrier.  
As it can be seen this sub-paragraph does not totally exclude tort liability (as the 
first one does), but as pointed out on several occasions (p. 33) , it is to be 
construed as a restriction of liability clause, thus the considerations provided 
above on the application of the general rules on exclusion of liability clauses will 
be valid also in this case.   
This sub-paragraph operates in a residual manner meaning that, were the 
benefit of the total exclusions of liability under the first sub-paragraph not to be 
recognized75, the third party would benefit of the liability limitations afforded to 
the carrier (as expressed in this sub-paragraph).  
Furthermore, as evidenced above at p.33 , this sub-paragraph would then “add 
to” the international uniform protection only where it aims at covering all third 
parties to the carriage as long as they carry out some activity connected to it, 
whereas, under the material scope of exclusion, the clause would under this 
point not add to the protection of the international uniform law applicable to the 
contract of carriage where the Himalaya clause is inserted: the second sub-
paragraph, anchoring the amplitude of its protection on to the rules of the 
                                                        
75 This is the case when the total exclusion for negligent act is not admitted 
under the national rules or collides with the provisions of one of the applicable 
conventions. 
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convention that regulate the bill of lading in which the Himalaya clause is 
contained, would limit the liability of the servant/independent contractor  (all 
third parties) according to the rules of the specific convention (i.e. according to 
the defenses and limitations of liability provided under each convention).  
This highlights the big gap in the protection afforded by the first sub-paragraph 
vis-à-vis the second one: if the first sub-paragraph is declared null and void while 
the second paragraph is valid, this could result in the third party being liable for 
a negligent act that brought damage and being able to only limit its liability, not 
to completely exclude it.  
A questio quid iuris could come about if the first sub-clause is considered invalid 
because it provides too wide an exemption for the servant: would this affect the 
whole clause and its validity as a whole? The law that emerges from 
jurisprudence seems to accept that if a clause is struck by nullity76 limited to a 
specific party, the rest of the clause can “survive” and still be applicable: this 
follows from the principle of severability of the clause77. As a result of this, even if 
the first sub-paragraph of the Himalaya clause were to be struck by nullity where 
it grants total exclusion of liability for a shipowner (whose liability cannot be 
completely excluded ex Art 3(8) Hague-Visby rules), the rest of the provision 
would still apply for the part where it extends the defenses or limitations of 
liability of the carrier to the third party. 
 
4.4 Exclusion/restriction of tort liability by contract  
Another important issue to consider is if the parties are allowed to contractually 
exclude/limit tort liability: this observation will apply to the first prong of the 
Himalaya clause where the extra-contractual liability of the third party is to be 
completely excluded; it can also apply to the second prong of the clause, to the 
                                                        
76 Note that the categories of nullity, invalidity and inapplicability are used here 
interchangeably, meaning any sanction that affects the provision and deprives it 
of any legal effects; these categories are however distinct in the law of different 
countries but for the purposes of this contribution they are considered equal. 
77 See Svenska Traktor Akt. v Maritime Agencies, in Lloyd´s Rep. p. 130 
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extent where the extension of the defenses of the carrier to the third party 
contributes to limiting part of the third party´s tortious liability78. 
Tort liability is regarded as a violation of an erga omnes right, i.e. a right 
enforceable against all individuals, a right that comes about as it is regarded by 
the legal order worthy of protection, whereas a contractual breach (a contractual 
liability) is regarded as a lesser violation as it arises when the right to the 
fulfillment of a specific obligation has not been respected, when a relative right 
(one enforceable only towards the specific counterparty of the contract) has 
been infringed, a right that comes about only as the product of the free will of the 
parties and not directly as the product of the legal system. A terminal operator 
might incur contractual liability if it does not respect the terms of the contract 
and it delivers wrong goods to the cargo receiver (or, for example, if it does not 
deliver the goods timely): this conduct will amount to a breach of the contractual 
obligations of the terminal operator towards the counterparty of the contract 
(which could be, under a contract of service, the carrier of the cargo, or, under a 
FIO clause, the cargo interests); if the goods were lost or completely damaged, 
this would amount also to an extra-contractual breach and produce tort liability. 
The existence of both contractual and extra-contractual liability is recognized in 
most jurisdictions and from one fact both liabilities can arise and it is possible to 
claim both under free concurrence of liabilities rules.   
Since tort liability affects more directly primary goods and rights that the legal 
orders aim at protecting, some jurisdictions are not keen in allowing private 
parties (by means of an instrument expression of the free will of the parties, i.e. 
the contract) to restrict their liability regarding this realm. In France the 
jurisprudence is oriented towards denying the possibility of excluding tort 
liability, and so are Italy and Spain whereas countries such as Germany, England 
                                                        
78 With regards to the second prong, one could be tempted to answer that it is 
possible to limit the liability of a third party, since it is so established in the 
international uniform law conventions when they allow to limit part of the 
liability of the third parties against a cargo interest, but it must be evidenced how 
exactly here the core of the matter lies: one thing is in fact to restrict (or even 
totally exclude) liability by means of a statute or a conventions, another is to 
leave it to the free will of the parties to limit/exclude such type of liability: it can 
be argued that the issue at hand deals then with the source of the exclusion of the 
liability. 
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and Belgium allow such restrictions, provided that the liability is founded on a 
negligent conduct79.   
Another important aspect in this context is the fact that the tort liability that the 
Himalaya clause is set out to exclude is a tort liability towards a third party and 
not towards the contractual counterparty: many jurisdiction allow to exclude to 
some degree the liability that arises out of the negligent conduct of an employee 
towards its employer as this liability is attributed to the risk of enterprise, a sort 
of allocation of risk doctrine that recognizes that the employer/entrepreneur is 
reasonably expected to suffer while carrying out such an activity that will bring 
him a commercial gain/profit. But the legal systems do not justify an exclusion of 
the liability of an employee when such liability causes damages and losses to a 
third party external to the employment relationship (except for some: see the 
Dutch civil code at Art 6.257 NBW, mentioned above).  
In the context of the applicability of the Himalaya clause, it can be inquired also if 
to exclude the tort liability of a non-contractual party is possible under the rules 
that govern exclusion of liability80: since the contractual party against which the 
exclusion is enforced is in a less favorable position, the jurisprudence in many 
countries has stated that the extent of the liability exclusion (what 
losses/damages are covered by the liability restriction) has to be made clear, and 
where it is not clear, it will be construed contra proferentem: it follows that the 
identity of the third party against which the cargo interests cannot enforce a 
liability claim will have to be clearly identified81. If this requirement were not 
fulfilled, it would seem that the clause could not operate against the cargo 
interests: the requirement of the identity of the beneficiary is also present in the 
rules that govern the contract to the benefit of a third party. Due to the particular 
nature of the Himalaya clause, which is at the same time an exclusion of liability 
clause and a contract for the benefit of a third party (which does not confer a 
right but a defense, or exclusion of liability), the same requirement is present but 
it satisfies different rationales: in the context of the exclusion clause, the 
                                                        
79 See C. von Bar, Non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to 
another, 2009, p. 895-899 
80 It has been evidenced that the rules that govern the contract to the benefit of a 
third party can apply to this clause. 
81 See C. von Bar, ibid. p. 895-899 
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justification for this requirement is that the exclusion of liability implies that the 
cargo interests cannot proceed against a specific subject (thus limiting their 
possibilities of recovering the damages to the carrier only, possibilities which 
will be furthermore limited by the carrier´s limitation of liability rules present in 
the international conventions) and it is evident how this information is 
important as it could make the cargo interests choose a different carrier that 
offers a contract of carriage free from this clause82. 
If the contract of carriage in which the Himalaya clause is inserted, is between a 
carrier (representing a business) and the cargo interests represents a consumer, 
the contract is also caught under the rules on unfair contract terms. Many 
national legislative systems provide for an unfair contractual terms regulation83.    
 
  
 
 
 
5 Circular indemnity clauses 
 
This clause acts as an alternative drafting instrument to the Himalaya clause 
used by the parties to a contract of carriage (or often also charter-party 
agreements) to achieve the result of protecting the third party from claims from 
the consignee for damages to the cargo. This clause is often embedded in the text 
of the Himalaya clause or it accompanies it as an additional sub-paragraph but it 
is considered a separate provision from the Himalaya one84.  
This clause consists of two parts: one is the undertaking from the cargo interest 
to the carrier not to sue or make any allegation as to liability of the third party; 
the second part lays down that, in case the cargo owner proceeds with a claim 
                                                        
82 For the rationale in the framework of the stipulation for another, see previous 
chapter. 
83 Also in light of regional supranational legislation such as the EU Directive on 
unfair terms in consumer contracts Council Directive 93/13/EEC. 
84 See G. Treitel et al., Carver on Bills of Lading, 3 ed., p. 468 
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against the above third party, in breach of the promise, the cargo owner will 
indemnify the carrier for the consequences suffered by the carrier from such 
claim.  
The first part of the clause is similar to the first paragraph of the Himalaya 
clause, which provides that no liability shall be claimed against the third party to 
the contract of carriage. It would seem that if no liability is to be moved against 
the third party, a fortiori, no action for such liability should be taken: it would 
thus follows that the first sub-paragraph of the circular indemnity clause only 
refers to the procedural aspect of the waiver to enforce liability against the third 
party (whereas the Himalaya clause´s language is more general and states 
broadly that no liability shall be imposed). Despite this consideration, in The 
Starsin, the British court hearing the case, established that “a stipulation that 
third parties shall not be under any liability to the cargo interests cannot be read 
as a covenant not to enforce such liability”85.  
The mechanism and rationale upon which this clause builds consist in making it 
unattractive for the cargo owner to proceed directly against the tortfeasor (the 
third party) as by doing so, the cargo interests would meet their own claim and 
eventually, not achieve any effective restoration of the damage suffered: as a 
matter of fact, once the cargo owner proceeds against the wrongdoer, the latter 
will have to compensate the former; this causes the third party/wrongdoer to 
proceed against the carrier by virtue of an indemnity clause contained in the 
contract that regulates their relationship (most often, either a contract of 
employment or of service): the third party will claim from the carrier the amount 
it compensated to the cargo owner; lastly, the carrier, by virtue of the circular 
indemnity clause, can seek indemnification from the cargo owner with regards to 
the amount conferred to the servant (which is the exact amount the servant was 
held liable for against the cargo owner). It is clear how this circular mechanism, 
as mentioned above, prevents the cargo interest from obtaining any effective 
restoration.  
                                                        
85 See Homburg Houtimport v Agrostine Private (The Starsin) [2003] and B. Eder 
et al., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 22 Edition, p. 57; it is 
doubtful that a similar conclusion would be reached under civil law in light of the 
above considerations. 
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This seemingly elaborate structure has the advantage over the Himalaya clause 
of not requiring an agency relationship between the carrier and the 
servant/independent contractor with all the difficulties that it implies at 
common law86.  
Furthermore, at common law, it allows the promisee (the carrier) to proceed for 
a stay of the action proposed by the cargo interest and founded in tort against 
the third party87: this is the result of the breach of the promise not to sue made 
by the cargo interest to the carrier: this stay of action relies upon the initiative of 
the carrier (but the carrier has a strong incentive in this as he also has an interest 
in the third party not being sued, see below) also in light of the fact that the third 
party itself cannot oppose the promise not to sue to the cargo owner88. The 
specimen clause provided in this work, however, contains an express provision 
stating that the servant/third party can enforce the promise itself directly 
against the claimant.   
In order for the stay of proceedings to be successful, the carrier must have an 
interest in the remedy: the interest must have a financial aspect and must be a 
real interest: a sufficient interest can consist in the carrier being exposed to 
liability to the servant based on the contract of employment/contract of 
service89: in fact, most service agreements entered into between the carrier and 
its subcontractor (where the subcontractor is offering a service to the carrier for 
the purposes of the carriage of goods) contain a provision by virtue of which the 
subcontractor is to be indemnified by the carrier in case of a claim addressed by 
a cargo interest to the subcontractor; this is also called an indemnity clause90.  
                                                        
86 The agency doctrine was developed at common law in an attempt to justify the 
mechanisms of the Himalaya clauses, otherwise unenforceable due to privity of 
contract. 
87 A stay of action is a common law instrument provided for under s. 49, Senior 
Courts Act 1981 
88 The promise not to sue is enforceable by the third party if it is contained in a 
charter-party agreement, see B. Eder et al., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of 
Lading, 22 Edition, p. 57. 
89 The promisee must have “a legal obligation to indemnify the third party against 
liability on the claim brought in breach of the covenant”: B. Eder et al., Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 22 Edition, p. 58; see also G. Treitel et al., 
Carver on Bills of Lading, 3 ed., p. 468 
90 see W. Richards, ibid., p. 217 
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Under civil law, the first part of this clause, where an obligation not to sue is 
undertaken by the cargo interest, could be construed as a contract to the benefit 
of a third party, or, as it is evidenced above91 as a contract with a performance to 
the benefit of a third party.   
 
5.1 Nullity of the clause 
As the indirect result of the clause is to keep the third party completely free of 
liability for its negligent acts, such effect must not contravene the rules laid down 
in the international uniform system: the Hague-Visby rules impose that a 
shipowner which acts as a third party to the carriage can benefit from the 
carrier´s limitations of liability, but cannot exclude his liability for negligent acts 
imputable to it (Art 3(8)) beyond what is provided for in the convention: the 
clause will thus be null and void for the part where it would free the shipowner 
of liability when such liability is not exempted already under the convention 
rules; the same reasoning applies with regards to maritime performing parties 
who, acting as third parties to the carriage, cannot exclude their liability beyond 
the Rotterdam Convention (Art 79).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
91 See p. 19 
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6 Coordination issues of the Himalaya clause with other 
contracts  
 
It has been established that, when a valid Himalaya clause operates among the 
different subjects of the contract of carriage, the cargo receiver will not be 
entitled to bring a claim against the third party nor to hold the latter liable (at all  
or to the maximum extent to which the carrier is liable).  
However, the third party to the contract of carriage has most likely entered into a 
separate contract with the carrier: this contract regulates the activities that the 
specific third party (a stevedore, an employee such as master or crew when the 
carrier is also the ship owner, a port terminal operator, etc.) obliges itself to 
perform to the carrier in order for the carrier to carry out the carriage operation 
[[as mentioned above, the carriage of goods can consist of many different 
segments and operations, some of which are carried out by specialized 
operators, creating thus an intricate connection of different sub-contracts 
justified in name of the business and commercial specialization of different 
actors]]. Since the operations carried out by the third party are ancillary to the 
contract of carriage, some of these activities can be construed as being rendered 
in favor of the cargo receiver, thus fitting the category of the stipulation for 
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another. The cargo receiver will thus have the possibility, according to its 
position as beneficiary of the obligation of the contract, to claim the performance 
contained in the contract: the cargo owner will thus enforce his right flowing 
from the contract between the carrier and (for example) the stevedore. 
Consequently, if the servant/agent/independent contractor while performing his 
obligations towards the employer (the carrier) for the benefit of the third party 
(the cargo receiver) produces damages to the goods, the cargo interests will be 
able to pursue a liability claim based on the contract of service/employment.  
As a result, the cargo interests would be able to bring a claim against the 
servant/independent contractor outside of the system of the carriage of goods 
contract and outside of the corresponding defenses and limitations of liability.  
The Himalaya clause (contained in a different contract) cannot prevail over the 
provisions of the other contract. Neither can the circular indemnity clause 
protect against the effects of a contract to the benefit of the cargo interest.  
It could be argued that to consider the contract of service between the carrier 
and the terminal operator as a stipulation for another, would be to misinterpret 
the function of the terminal operator´s activities which are instrumental and 
subordinated to the carriage of goods: it could be argued nevertheless just as 
strongly in the opposite direction, by submitting that the contract of service is 
autonomous and functionally independent from the carriage, also in light of the 
fact that the operations are complex and economically distinguished from the 
carriage operations, and require a high degree of investment by the part of such 
professional businesses. To argue in this direction, would justify to construe the 
contract of service as a stipulation for another in which the liabilities that arise, 
should not be limited by contractual clauses (Himalaya clauses) contained in 
contracts (contracts of carriage of goods) that regulate other matters.  
The autonomy of the contract of terminal port service has been recognized, for 
instance, in a recent case by the Naples Tribunal in Italy92 where the judges 
attributed to such contract the legal qualification of a stipulation for another 
with regards to the liability of the stevedore against the cargo owner.  
                                                        
92 Ras Assicurazioni v Cosco Container Lines, Trib. Napoli 4 Febr. 2008, Dir. 
Marittimo, Dec 2010, p. 588 
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It can be suggested in de lege ferenda perspective, that the commercial practice 
and the legislator take this detail also into account and regulate the matter 
accordingly, in order to avoid any possibility for holding the third party to the 
contract of carriage liable towards the cargo interests or in order, at least, to 
better redistribute the risk allocation.  
 
 
 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
This work has focused mostly on some legal challenges that the Himalaya clause 
has raised in the context of the exclusion of liability that it confers and the 
contractual model it is inspired to (this contractual model being similar but not 
exactly overlapping with the mechanisms of the circular indemnity clause, also 
described in this work). Neither one of these issues seem to be unresolved, yet 
this work suggests new perspectives and approaches and raises, nevertheless, 
critical points where the coordination of this clause is difficult with other 
contracts in the carriage/logistics sector.  With regards to this point, it can be 
appreciated how the modern trade of carriage of goods by sea is no longer 
characterized by only pure carriage operations (and other operations are merely 
ancillary to it), but where the carriage is only one segment of a complex of 
different operations, as well interpreted and regulated under the Rotterdam 
rules. 
New trends in business organization and legislative developments may induce to 
question the need of a Himalaya clause: the clause was conceived as a 
contractual instrument in order to address a situation that the legislator had not 
regulated and that needed protection for the sake of the organization of the 
carriage of goods by sea which relied much upon subjects who performed some 
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of the tasks and obligations of the carrier: individual subjects as employees of the 
carrier received legislative protection first, eventually, throughout the years and 
after another sea carriage Convention, under the Rotterdam rules (not yet in 
force!) even independent contractors of all sorts would benefit of the carrier´s 
protection, making the clause necessary only for inland carriers; furthermore, 
most independent contractors are nowadays big terminal operator companies 
far from the secondary position their predecessors occupied in the market with 
respect to carrier companies: this is also implied within the Rotterdam rules 
which confer to maritime performing parties (that are not master, crew of the 
vessel or employees), a position of liability comparable to the one of the carrier. 
The Himalaya clause, while the Rotterdam rules await ratification, is 
nevertheless still widely in use, as a very efficient tool for restricting liability, 
also in light of the lack of an international convention on the liability of terminal 
operators and the lack of uniformity at the level of national legislation in 
different countries providing protection for such parties (France being the only 
major shipping economy to have adopted a specific national legislation for the 
regulation of the liability of terminal operators).  
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